

UNCLASSIFIED

SSG Frank Gasper  
FA-18-0083

Approved For Release

Pages 1 through 3 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)  
(b)(5), (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BY INVESTIGATING OFFICER/BOARD OF OFFICERS**

For use of this form, see AR 15-6; the proponent agency is OTJAG.

IF MORE SPACE IS REQUIRED IN FILLING OUT ANY PORTION OF THIS FORM, ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS

**SECTION I - APPOINTMENT**

Appointed by (b)(6), (b)(3) Special Operations Task Force Central  
(Appointing authority)

on 26 May 2008 (Date) (Attach inclosure 1: Letter of appointment or summary of oral appointment data.) (See para 3-15, AR 15-6.)

**SECTION II - SESSIONS**

The (investigation) (board) commenced at Radwaniyah Palace Complex, Baghdad, Iraq at 1500 local  
(Place) (Time)

on 27 May 2008 (Date) (If a formal board met for more than one session, check here . Indicate in an inclosure the time each session began and ended, the place, persons present and absent, and explanation of absences, if any.) The following persons (members, respondents, counsel) were present: (After each name, indicate capacity, e.g., President, Recorder, Member, Legal Advisor.)

The following persons (members, respondents, counsel) were absent: (Include brief explanation of each absence.) (See paras 5-2 and 5-8a, AR 15-6.)

The (investigating officer) (board) finished gathering/hearing evidence at 2200 on 3 JUNE 2008  
(Time) (Date)  
and completed findings and recommendations at 0100 on 3 JUN 2008  
(Time) (Date)

**SECTION III - CHECKLIST FOR PROCEEDINGS**

A. COMPLETE IN ALL CASES		YES	NO <sup>1/</sup>	NA <sup>2/</sup>
1	Inclosures (para 3-15, AR 15-6)			
	Are the following inclosed and numbered consecutively with Roman numerals: (Attached in order listed)			
	a. The letter of appointment or a summary of oral appointment data?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	b. Copy of notice to respondent, if any?(See item 9, below)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	c. Other correspondence with respondent or counsel, if any?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	d. All other written communications to or from the appointing authority?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	e. Privacy Act Statements(Certificate, if statement provided orally)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	f. Explanation by the investigating officer or board of any unusual delays, difficulties, irregularities, or other problems encountered (e.g., absence of material witnesses)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	g. Information as to sessions of a formal board not included on page 1 of this report?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	h. Any other significant papers (other than evidence) relating to administrative aspects of the investigation or board?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

FOOTNOTES: <sup>1/</sup> Explain all negative answers on an attached sheet.  
<sup>2/</sup> Use of the N/A column constitutes a positive representation that the circumstances described in the question did not occur in this investigation or board.

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		YES	NO <sup>1/</sup>	NA <sup>2/</sup>
2	Exhibits (para 3-16, AR 15-6)			
	a. Are all items offered (whether or not received) or considered as evidence individually numbered or lettered as exhibits and attached to this report?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	b. Is an index of all exhibits offered to or considered by investigating officer or board attached before the first exhibit?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	c. Has the testimony/statement of each witness been recorded verbatim or been reduced to written form and attached as an exhibit?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	d. Are copies, descriptions, or depictions (if substituted for real or documentary evidence) properly authenticated and is the location of the original evidence indicated?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	e. Are descriptions or diagrams included of locations visited by the investigating officer or board (para 3-6b, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	f. Is each written stipulation attached as an exhibit and is each oral stipulation either reduced to writing and made an exhibit or recorded in a verbatim record?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	g. If official notice of any matter was taken over the objection of a respondent or counsel, is a statement of the matter of which official notice was taken attached as an exhibit (para 3-16d, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
3	Was a quorum present when the board voted on findings and recommendations (paras 4-1 and 5-2b, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
<b>B. COMPLETE ONLY FOR FORMAL BOARD PROCEEDINGS (Chapter 5, AR 15-6)</b>				
4	At the initial session, did the recorder read, or determine that all participants had read, the letter of appointment (para 5-3b, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
5	Was a quorum present at every session of the board (para 5-2b, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
6	Was each absence of any member properly excused (para 5-2a, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7	Were members, witnesses, reporter, and interpreter sworn, if required (para 3-1, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8	If any members who voted on findings or recommendations were not present when the board received some evidence, does the inclosure describe how they familiarized themselves with that evidence (para 5-2d, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>C. COMPLETE ONLY IF RESPONDENT WAS DESIGNATED (Section II, Chapter 5, AR 15-6)</b>				
9	Notice to respondents (para 5-5, AR 15-6):			
	a. Is the method and date of delivery to the respondent indicated on each letter of notification?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	b. Was the date of delivery at least five working days prior to the first session of the board?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	c. Does each letter of notification indicate —	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	(1) the date, hour, and place of the first session of the board concerning that respondent?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	(2) the matter to be investigated, including specific allegations against the respondent, if any?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	(3) the respondent's rights with regard to counsel?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	(4) the name and address of each witness expected to be called by the recorder?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	(5) the respondent's rights to be present, present evidence, and call witnesses?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	d. Was the respondent provided a copy of all unclassified documents in the case file?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	e. If there were relevant classified materials, were the respondent and his counsel given access and an opportunity to examine them?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10	If any respondent was designated after the proceedings began (or otherwise was absent during part of the proceedings):			
	a. Was he properly notified (para 5-5, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	b. Was record of proceedings and evidence received in his absence made available for examination by him and his counsel (para 5-4c, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11	Counsel (para 5-6, AR 15-6):			
	a. Was each respondent represented by counsel?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Name and business address of counsel:			
	(If counsel is a lawyer, check here <input type="checkbox"/> )			
	b. Was respondent's counsel present at all open sessions of the board relating to that respondent?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	c. If military counsel was requested but not made available, is a copy (or, if oral, a summary) of the request and the action taken on it included in the report (para 5-6b, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12	If the respondent challenged the legal advisor or any voting member for lack of impartiality (para 5-7, AR 15-6):			
	a. Was the challenge properly denied and by the appropriate officer?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	b. Did each member successfully challenged cease to participate in the proceedings?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
13	Was the respondent given an opportunity to (para 5-8a, AR 15-6):			
	a. Be present with his counsel at all open sessions of the board which deal with any matter which concerns that respondent?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	b. Examine and object to the introduction of real and documentary evidence, including written statements?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	c. Object to the testimony of witnesses and cross-examine witnesses other than his own?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	d. Call witnesses and otherwise introduce evidence?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	e. Testify as a witness?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	f. Make or have his counsel make a final statement or argument (para 5-9, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
14	If requested, did the recorder assist the respondent in obtaining evidence in possession of the Government and in arranging for the presence of witnesses (para 5-8b, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15	Are all of the respondent's requests and objections which were denied indicated in the report of proceedings or in an inclosure or exhibit to it (para 5-11, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>FOOTNOTES:</b> 1/ Explain all negative answers on an attached sheet. 2/ Use of the N/A column constitutes a positive representation that the circumstances described in the question did not occur in this investigation or board.				

**SECTION IV - FINDINGS** (para 3-10, AR 15-6)

The (investigating officer) (board) , having carefully considered the evidence, finds:

See attached memorandum.

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**SECTION V - RECOMMENDATIONS** (para 3-11, AR 15-6)

In view of the above findings, the (investigating officer) (board) recommends:

See attached memorandum.

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SECTION VI - AUTHENTICATION (para 3-17, AR 15-6)

THIS REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS IS COMPLETE AND ACCURATE. (If any voting member or the recorder fails to sign here or in Section VII below, indicate the reason in the space where his signature should appear.)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Recorder)

(b)(6), (b)(3)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Member)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Member)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Member)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Member)

SECTION VII - MINORITY REPORT (para 3-13, AR 15-6)

To the extent indicated in Inclosure \_\_\_\_\_, the undersigned do(es) not concur in the findings and recommendations of the board. (In the inclosure, identify by number each finding and/or recommendation in which the dissenting member(s) do(es) not concur. State the reasons for disagreement. Additional/substitute findings and/or recommendations may be included in the inclosure.)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Member)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Member)

SECTION VIII - ACTION BY APPOINTING

(b)(6), (b)(3)

The findings and recommendations of the (investigating officer) (board) a (substitutions). (If the appointing authority returns the proceedings to the in corrective action, attach that correspondence (or a summary, if oral) as a numbered inclosure.)

roved with following exceptions/  
her proceedings or

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(b)(6), (b)(3)

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~~SECRET//REL ACGU/LIMDIS//MR~~

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**

Special Operations Task Force-Central  
Radwaniyah Palace Complex, Baghdad, Iraq  
APO AE 09342

AOSO-SFC-CO

4 June 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR (b)(3), (b)(6) Special Operations Task Force -- Central, Radwaniyah  
Palace Complex, Baghdad, Iraq, APO AE 09342

Subject: Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 investigation

1. On 26 May 2008 I received an appointment as an AR 15-6 investigation officer and was directed to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the death of SSG Frank J. Gasper, HSC 10<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group (A).

2. On 25 May 2008 the Members of HSC, 10<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group (A) and attachments, conducted a sustainment operations combat patrol convoy to several locations in the Special Operation Task Force Central (SOTF-C) Area of Operations (b)(3) Convoy). After completing leg two of the sustainment convoy, leaving Diwaniyah Iraq enroute to Najaf Iraq, truck number one was struck by an Explosive Formed Penetrator (EFP) on route Madrid, at grid coordinate 38A MA 56116 33633 killing the driver SSG Gasper, and seriously wounding the Truck

(b)(3), (b)(6)

3. Findings of Fact:

a. Pre-operational safety briefings, Military Intelligence assessments and Standard Operating Procedures were used and were conducted prior to the combat patrol movement (Encls 2, 4, 5, 11, 12, 13).

b. All of the M1151 vehicles in the Serpent Convoy possessed counter Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and EFP electronic warfare countermeasure systems known as the Multi Mobile Ban Jammers (MMBJ), M1151 MMBJ equipment was on and functioning during the Serpent convoy operation (Encls 8, 11-15).

c. All members of the convoy were wearing Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) (Encls 2, 20, 22, 24).

~~SECRET//REL ACGU/LIMDIS//MR~~

~~SECRET//REL ACQU/LIMDIS//MR~~

AOSO-SFC-SN-CO

Subject: Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 investigation

- d. On 25 May 2008 at 1340 hours vehicle one of the sustainment Convoy, Call Sign (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) was traveling West on Route Madrid at approximately 45 miles an hour when it was struck by a 5 cone steel EFP Anti Armor Improvised Explosive Device (AAIED) with a secondary fragment producing charge. The EFP array was placed 1 meter off the shoulder of the West bound lane of Route Madrid and upon detonation caused catastrophic armor penetration to at least 5 areas on the driver's side of M1151 HMMWV. Immediately following the EFP detonation, the M1151 caught fire and swerved to the left crossing over the oncoming lanes of traffic, traveled down an embankment, and came to rest in a ditch approximately 6 to 7 feet in depth (Encls 11, 12, 13).
- e. Staff Sergeant Gasper was most likely killed instantly by the EFP blast (Encls 8, 11, 17).
- f. After coming to rest, the vehicle was completely engulfed in flames and (b)(3), (b)(6) although severely wounded, exited the vehicle and fell to the ground. The intensity of the fire caused the ammunition inside the vehicle to explode (Encls 11, 12, 13).
- g. (b)(3), (b)(6) was severely wounded by the shrapnel of the EFP blast and likely was ejected from the gunner's position of the M1151 by the vehicles impact into the ditch (Encls 11-17).
- h. (b)(3), (b)(6) provided immediate life saving medical treatment to (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) Encls 1-17).
- i. After the EFP attack a 9 line Medical Evacuation message (MEDEVAC) was immediately transmitted by the convoy (b)(3), (b)(6) via all communication platforms available to the convoy. Additionally, other members of the convoy transmitted MEDAVAC messages. Members of the convoy could not confirm receipt of their radio transmissions due to atmospheric or electronic interference. Radio messages were positively received by satellite and or FM communication at the SOTF-C, CJSOTF-AP OPCEN, M0/276, C Co 1/26 Infantry TOC, 2/3 Battle Captain 3<sup>rd</sup> CAB 3rdID, ODA 0326 TOC and FOB Echo TMC (Encls 3, 7, 10-17).
- j. The MMBJ equipment in all M1151 vehicles is "hard wired" to the battery of the vehicle. Convoy vehicle number one's MMBJ was not turned off after the explosion, potentially jamming radio controlled devices up to a range of 300 meters until the MMBJ battery power source was rendered inoperable (Encls 15, 17, 12).

~~SECRET//REL ACQU/LIMDIS//MR~~



AOSO-SFC-SN-CO

Subject: Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 investigation

k. The MEDEVAC request was received by Camp Echo, Diwanayah MEDEVAC assets via Microsoft Internal Remote Chat (MIRC) at 1414 hrs. Due to RED weather conditions the MEDEVAC departure was delayed and the MEDEVAC departed FOB Echo, in Diwahaniyah, at 1445hrs. The MEDEVAC arrived at the scene of the EFP attack at 1500hrs. The MEDEVAC transported (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) and flew in Red weather conditions, arriving at Talil Hospital at 1552 hours (Encl 7).

l. Based on all of the aforementioned findings of fact I find that neither negligence nor misconduct were the proximate or contributory cause of this incident.

4. Considering the findings, I recommend as follows.

(b)(5), (b)(3), (b)(6)

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

31 Encls

1. AR-15-6 appointment Memorandum
2. SUPCEN (b)(3) CONOP
3. SOTF-C OPCEN daily log
4. Printed E-mail from SOTF-C S-2 ASPs
5. Convoy route assessment
6. OPREP 3
7. MEDEVAC AAR
8. EOD post blast analysis

AOSO-SFC-SN-CO

Subject: Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 investigation

- 9. Printed e-mail from CJSOTF-AP Counter IED Officer
- 10. ODA 0326 SPOT report
- 11. DA Form 2823 [redacted]
- 12. DA Form 2823 [redacted]
- 13. DA Form 2823 [redacted]
- 14. DA Form 2823 [redacted]
- 15. DA Form 2823 [redacted]
- 16. DA Form 2823 [redacted]
- 17. DA Form 2823 [redacted]
- 18. DA Form 2823 [redacted]
- 19. Photo of [redacted] DA Form 2823
- 20. DA Form 2823 [redacted] (un sworn)
- 21. DA Form 1156 [redacted]
- 22. Casualty report [redacted]
- 23. DA Form 1156 [redacted]
- 24. Casualty report [redacted]
- 25. DA Form 1156 SSG Gasper
- 26. Casualty report SSG Gasper
- 27. Post recovery Photo 1 [redacted] M1151
- 28. Post recovery Photo 2 [redacted] M1151
- 29. Post recovery Photo 3 [redacted] M1151
- 30. Post recovery Photo 4 [redacted] M1151
- 31. Post recovery Photo 5 [redacted] M1151

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**SWORN STATEMENT**

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).  
**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.  
**ROUTINE USES:** Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.  
**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION SOTF-C Baghdad, Iraq, APO AE 09342	2. DATE (YYYYMM) (b)(6), (b)(3) 20080601	3. TIME (b)(6), (b)(3) 1521	4. FILE NUMBER (b)(6), (b)(3)
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(6), (b)(3)	6. SSN (b)(6), (b)(3)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(6), (b)(3) TIVE	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS HSC, 3RD BN, 10TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)			

9. I, (b)(6), (b)(3), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 24 May, 2008, at 1500 local time, myself and several other soldiers from the unit attended our pre mission brief for a level III CONOP that was to SP at 0800 the following morning. The mission brief consisted of (b)(6), (b)(3) discussing the mission, weather along the route, organization of the five gun trucks, the route, timeline, and known enemy threat along the route which was expected to be minimal. (b)(6), (b)(3) discussed the communications plan as well.

At around 0700 the next morning (25 May), we began final PCIs (pre combat inspection) of all the trucks to include communications and C2 equipment, weapon systems, vehicle pmcs, and other gear (aid bags, water, etc.). The trucks were organized into their order, myself being the Truck Commander for the third truck. Just prior to 0800, all personnel were gathered into a circle and we made commo checks with our personal MBITR radios. We loaded up and SP'ed right around 0800. Our route was to be down route Tampa to Kalsu; Kalsu to Diwaniyah, Diwaniyah to Najaf, Najaf to Hillah, Hillah to Kalsu, and then RTB.

Everything was going as planned except that (b)(6), (b)(3) was unable to contact higher along our route to call in checkpoints. We SP'ed from Diwaniyah at approximately 1230 or so along MSR Madrid enroute to Najaf. The road seemed quiet until our lead vehicle struck an IED at around 1350. The blast seemed small, and having struck IEDs before, I assumed that truck one probably only received surficial damage and had blown through the blast. I could hear truck two trying to contact truck one but was getting no response. Off to my immediate right was a large burm and a tree line, and I was concerned of a secondary attack, so I stay inside my vehicle and told my gunner (b)(6), (b)(3) to scan the tree line for a trigger man while I scanned around the vehicle and also tried to locate truck one. I immediately switched my secondary radio to the Sheriff net (MSR QRF) in the event that we came under a secondary attack. At this point I did not know where truck one was. All I can remember hearing was that we were going to need a MEDEVAC and (b)(6), (b)(3) was told to call for it. It was around this time (I guess it to be within a few minutes of the initial explosion). After finding out where truck one was at, I heard that it was on fire. I got on our internal radio comms and asked if anyone needed help at which point (b)(6), (b)(3) called for a stretcher. I jumped out of my vehicle and retrieved a stretcher from the trunk and ran about 30 meters to the left side of my vehicle down an embankment where I found (b)(6), (b)(3) attending to (b)(6), (b)(3). The truck was engulfed in flames, and rounds from inside the vehicle were "cooking off" all around us. I stayed there to help attend to the casualty. I did not see any other crew members of truck 1 and began to get very concerned. (b)(6), (b)(3) came over the radio and said that he could not make contact with a MEDEVAC. (b)(6), (b)(3) me to get on the radio. I ran back up the hill to my truck to try and call for the medevac. My first attempt was on the vehicle radio on the medevac channel. I had no luck, so I switched to the Sheriff net, then to the CJSOTF SATCOM channel. I made several attempts on each channel, but was getting no response. At this point I tried to call for a MEDEVAC on the FBCB2. I continued to cycle through the communication and C2 system without any luck for what seemed like hours. I do not know how long it actually was. (b)(6), (b)(3) came to my truck to get a status, and I told him I was unable to reach anyone, at which point he jumped in and made his efforts. I went back to (b)(6), (b)(3) to see if I could help in any way. On my way to (b)(6), (b)(3) I saw that (b)(6), (b)(3) had already been placed on a stretcher and had been moved up the hill away from the crash site next to one of our vehicles on the road. At this time, (b)(6), (b)(3) had (b)(6), (b)(3) ready to be loaded onto a stretcher, so myself and (b)(6), (b)(3) loaded (b)(6), (b)(3) onto the stretcher and we moved him up the hill to where (b)(6), (b)(3) was. I then ran back to my vehicle to see if (b)(6), (b)(3) had an luck in contacting a MEDEVAC. He told me that he didn't get through either. It was at this point that I asked him where SGT Frank Gasper was. He told me the "He's gone... he's dead". Both (b)(6), (b)(3) wounds were very serious from what I could tell, so I knew I needed to get a MEDEVAC in there fast or it was going to be more than just one KIA. I got back in the truck and continued to run through all the means I had to try to get a MEDEVAC or some kind of help at all. Finally, I got through to CJSOTF and requested an immediate MEDEVAC. I sent up an abbreviated 9 line and awaited an ETA. Additionally, I made contact on the FBCB2 with SOTF-C OPCEN and an EOD unit who asked if we need help recovering the vehicle. While I was waiting I also was able to make contact with ODA 0324 who informed me that they were already on their way from Najaf and would be at our location in approximately 30 minutes. I continued to request an eta for the MEDEVAC about every 2 to 3 minutes while trying to keep all members of our team informed of the situation via our internal net. I think it was about 20 minutes after my initial 9 line that I heard that our MEDEVAC was enroute with an ETA of 50 minutes. I remained on the radio and tried to send up a SITREP to higher and continue to answer calls from ODA 0324 and AOB 0320. To the best of my knowledge, at approximately 1445 to 1450, ODA 0324 arrived on scene and began to clear the surrounding area. Shortly after their arrival the MEDEVAC arrived on scene and immediately loaded the wounded into the choppers. The MEDEVAC was on scene for less than five minutes and lifted off. Somewhere between the arrival at this point, it became a recovery mission. We knew SGT Gasper was still inside the vehicle, so we had to get the fire out. The BOD team aided greatly in all aspects of the recovery as all of us were felling-

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(6), (b)(3)	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF \_\_\_\_\_ TAKEN AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_"  
 THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF

(b)(6), (b)(3)

TAKEN AT

*APC*

DATED

*17 Dec 08*

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

very fatigued at this point. The ODA had also detained two Iraqi civilians from a house near the site and began interrogation along with IA and EOD personnel. Once the fire was out as much as it could be, the EOD team attempted to pull the destroyed vehicle from the ditch where it had crashed into after the blast. At this point, the EOD team along with members of ODA 0324 recovered the remains of SGT Gasper from the vehicle, and began searching the site for sensitive items and debris that we did not want to leave at the scene. Once SGT Gasper was recovered, our team along with two ODA trucks and three IA trucks SPed enroute to Najaf and left EOD and the remainder of the ODA to continue recovery. Upon our arrival in Najaf, we downloaded our trucks and began a sensitive items inventory. From the time of the explosion until then, about four and a half hours had elapsed. Once sensitive items were accounted for and secured, we began personal recovery.

Q: (b)(6), (b)(3)

A: (b)(6), (b)(3)

Q: *Is there anything you wish to add or delete from your statement?*

A: *No* (b)(6), (b)(3)

(b)(6), (b)(3)

*END OF STATEMENT //*

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INITIALS OF

(b)(6), (b)(3)

MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE

*2*

OF

*3*

PAGES

STATEMENT OF (b)(6), (b)(3) TAKEN AT RR DATED 1 June 08

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(6), (b)(3)

(b)(6), (b)(3)

NOT USED

Approved For Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(6), (b)(3), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT (b)(6), (b)(3) FORWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR (b)(6), (b)(3)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 1 day of June, 08 at RR, Ruckel Pkwy

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(6), (b)(3)  
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(6), (b)(3)  
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Article 136 (b) (4)  
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT  
(b)(6), (b)(3)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

**SWORN STATEMENT**

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).  
**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.  
**ROUTINE USES:** Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.  
**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Radwahnyiah Palace Complex RPC, Baghdad, Iraq	2. DATE (YYYYMM) 2008/05/28	3. TIME 2100	4. FILE NUMBER (b)(6), (b)(3)
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(6), (b)(3)	6. SSN (b)(6), (b)(3)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(6), (b)(3) ACTIVE	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS SOTF-C SUPCENTER BAHDAD, IRAQ			

9. I, (b)(6), (b)(3), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

HSC 3rd BN 10th SFG(A) convoy team (b)(3), (b)(6) had been planning a combat logistics patrol in the SOTF-C AOR that would start off from the Radwahnyiah Palace Complex (RPC) and go through Kalsu (AOB 0320) to Diwaniyah (ODA 0326) then to Al Najaf (ODA 0324) then up to Al Hillah (ODA 0325) then on to Kalsu again before returning to RPC.

The day prior 24 May 2008 at 1500 hrs there was a convoy/mission brief that was conducted for all personnel that would be traveling in the convoy, all personnel were in attendance. The briefing covered the route by means of map orientation in the SUPCEN, order of movement, duty positions of key personnel, enemy situation, objectives at each stop and approximately the duration of the trip. It also covered special instructions to certain individuals i.e. gunners, T.C.'s.

The morning of 25 May 2008 the drivers had the vehicles lined up at 0600 for a 0700 SP time. All the FBCB2's were brought up to function and Comms checks between the vehicles were conducted with zero deficiencies. At approximately 0700 hours the Serpent element began movement toward Kalsu the first stop of the planned route, the first section on the convoy went very well communications between the vehicles was excellent and the spacing between the individual vehicles was good as well. Upon arrival at Kalsu there was a quick coordination meeting between the communication personnel and some equipment was dropped off. The (b)(3), (b)(6) element loaded up and departed for Diwaniyah again all aspects of convoy procedures went well.

Upon arrival at Diwaniyah the (b)(3), (b)(6) element linked up with (b)(6), (b)(3) and made preparations to down load ODA 0326's ISU's and pallet. While that was being done the members of (b)(3), (b)(6) got water and something to eat, immediately following the trucks were refueled and the convoy started the movement toward Al Najaf. Movement was going ahead of schedule due to the fact there was not a lot of traffic and the vehicles maintained good movement discipline.

On 25 May 2008 while conducting a combat patrol between Diwaniyah and Al Najaf Iraq approximately 2 km out side of the village of Al Shamiyah. The lead vehicle (b)(3), (b)(6) of a 6 vehicle convoy was hit by a EFP IED rendering the vehicle and its occupants non functional. After being struck the vehicle turned south crossing the median and the east bound two lane road, down an embankment and into a ditch approximately six to seven feet in depth. The second vehicle in the order of movement was a flat bed which immediately pulled to the side of the hard surfaced road (b)(3), (b)(6) went around the flat bed truck and picked up a blocking position on the west bound road, warning shots were fired to halt the flow of traffic in the east bound lane. The third vehicle in the order of movement was an add on vehicle to the convoy so it held a security position directly behind the flat bed truck with the main gun pulling security orienting in a northwest direction. Vehicle five in the convoy was the second flat bed truck which came to a stop on the road we had been traveling. (b)(3), (b)(6) stopped behind the Flat bed truck with the main gun orientating in a southern direction. (b)(3), (b)(6) stopped and set up a blocking position with the main gun orientating in an easterly direction. The TC of (b)(3), (b)(6) saw the explosion and immediately asked for a status report from (b)(3), (b)(6) no response was heard, and second status report was requested and no response was heard. The gunner (b)(3), (b)(6) notified the TC that the vehicle was in a ditch and smoking badly. The TC on (b)(3), (b)(6) exited the vehicle and moved to (b)(3), (b)(6) gave the Convoy (b)(6), (b)(3) start requesting MEDEVAC and QRF elements in the area while moving (b)(3), (b)(6) noticed that the (b)(3), (b)(6) vehicle was now on fire. (b)(3), (b)(6) immediately called for the convoy medics and fire extinguishers.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(6), (b)(3)	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF \_\_\_\_\_ TAKEN AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_"  
 THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

ENCL# 13

UNCLASSIFIED

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(6), (b)(3) TAKEN AT RPC DATED 2008/05/28

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

After talking with (b)(6), (b)(3) S2TC linked up with (b)(6), (b)(3) and began to clear the route down the embankment to the location of the vehicle, while S2TC and (b)(6), (b)(3) went to the vehicle (b)(6), (b)(3) retrieved his aid bag and followed. Approximately 30 meters from the vehicle we could see (b)(6), (b)(3) in the ditch he was conscious and calling for help. At this time the GMMV was 90% engulfed in flames with ammunition "cooking off" (b)(6), (b)(3) and (b)(6), (b)(3) entered the ditch and began attempting to retrieve (b)(6), (b)(3) and get him away from the immediate danger of the exploding ammunition or vehicle it was evident the (b)(6), (b)(3) leg was badly angulated and was continually saying " I think my back is broken" (b)(6), (b)(3) and (b)(6), (b)(3) carried (b)(6), (b)(3) out of the ditch and over a small berm to provide cover from the ammunition cooking off. Once (b)(6), (b)(3) was in a safe area (b)(6), (b)(3) began rendering first aid to a severely fractured leg with multiple open wounds by applying pressure bandages before proceeding to what looked like a fractured left arm and applying a splint. (b)(6), (b)(3) and (b)(6), (b)(3) continued to give first aid (b)(6), (b)(3) went back to the burning vehicle and saw (b)(6), (b)(3) the (b)(6), (b)(3) runner in the ditch on the opposite side of the vehicle. (b)(6), (b)(3) yelled that he found (b)(6), (b)(3) and he needed help immediately due to the fact the GNNV was now 100% engulfed in flames with 5.56 ammunition, .50 cal, 12 ga. and 9mm ammunition detonating. At that point (b)(6), (b)(3) went to (b)(6), (b)(3) location and again (b)(6), (b)(3) and (b)(6), (b)(3) began the extraction of (b)(6), (b)(3) from the ditch and behind a small mound of dirt for cover. Upon evacuating (b)(6), (b)(3) from the ditch, it was immediately evident (b)(6), (b)(3) had a life threatening injury to his right thigh (b)(6), (b)(3) called for a large tourniquet which was immediately applied to the groin area and tightened. (b)(6), (b)(3) then applied bandages to the large holes in his leg and then upon completion of initial trauma management of (b)(6), (b)(3) they were placed on litter and moved closer to the security elements for protection and preparation for MEDEVAC. (b)(6), (b)(3) continually upgraded and increased the level of treatment of the two injured personnel by readdressing wounds starting intravenous fluids and administering medicine to reduce the levels of pain for the injured soldiers but to allow them relax and not to disturb any of the treatment that had been performed up to that point. During this time (b)(6), (b)(3) continued to request MEDEVAC and QRF elements, finally getting communications approximately 30 minutes after the IED strike there was confirmation that a QRF and MEDEVAC notified (b)(6), (b)(3) went to inspect the culverts, the decision was made to await the QRF to clear due to the fact that he was alone and the culverts were too long and had vegetation that was about three feet in height running the length of the tunnels (b)(6), (b)(3) went back to vehicle four and check with (b)(6), (b)(3) and he informed me that ODA 0324 was three minutes. Upon arrival of ODA 0324, S2TC linked up with (b)(6), (b)(3) and 0324 elements and immediately had them clear the four culverts and the north side of the highway to a treeline that was approximately 250mtrs away. Upon completion of that (b)(6), (b)(3) and (b)(6), (b)(3) had 0324 start clearing the southern area of the highway. While a portion of the ODA was clearing the surrounding area the MEDEVAC HELO's X 2 arrived, the HELO's landed adjacent to the convoy security on the highway. (b)(6), (b)(3) linked up with the medics from the HELO's and gave them a quick overview of injuries sustained and treatment rendered. The patients were then loaded into the HELO's and departed for Tall and the medical facilities located there. The Mitt team from Al Najaf arrived with their host unit. (b)(6), (b)(3) the Mitt team leader immediately got out and began assistance in the recovery of both SGT Gasper and the GNNV with both his personnel and their recovery HEMMT wrecker. Several attempts had been made to retrieve the GNNV before the vehicle broke free of the suction of the mud. While lifting the the disabled vehicle the wrecker flipped over due to the angle that the wrecker was on and the amount of effort that was required to break he suction to get the vehicle up over the embankment. There were no significant injuries sustained in the rollover. This attempt was enough to lift the top portion of the GNNV off the lower section and to recover SGT. Gasper's remains. (b)(6), (b)(3) and his Mitt team performed the duties of recovery. SGT Gasper's remains were placed on to a litter and covered with an emergency blanket and then placed into the rear of the Mitt's (b)(6), (b)(3) Upon recovery of the remains (b)(6), (b)(3) said they would remain for the recovery of the vehicle take over recovery operation and had coordinated with the Mitt and their Iraqi army counterparts to escort us back to Camp Tarlavsky the camp where ODA 0324 resides. At that point The (b)(6), (b)(3) element conducted a sensitive items check a quick FRAGO of what was going to take place that night and general guidance for the following day's movement to Al Hilla. (b)(6), (b)(3) and myself immediately began making attempts to contact the FOB at RPC. After establishing contact all questions were answered in the order the came in by either SIPR net emails or by myself talking with (b)(6), (b)(3) and myself went to lay down and then woke up to the ODA's return. At that point we went and spoke to (b)(6), (b)(3) about how the recovery operations went. They relayed to (b)(6), (b)(3) that the vehicle could not be recovered that night and that SGT Gasper's remains had been moved to Diwaniyah since there was a medical facility to put his remain until they could be moved to Baghdad. A tentative schedule and time line was coordinated for the following day, then (b)(6), (b)(3) and myself went to sleep for the night. The next morning the vehicles were refueled comms checks performed and another sensitive items count was conducted. At 1115 ODA 0324 conducted a mission brief for the movement to Al Hillah which the entire (b)(6), (b)(3) was present for, the brief was concise and accurate. The two elements then went to load vehicles and perform movement prep for the 1200 SP time.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(6), (b)(3) PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATEMENT OF (b)(6), (b)(3) TAKEN AT RPC DATED 2008/05/28

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

The two elements linked up with the Najaf IA element that was to provide security up to Al Hillah where we were to drop off an ISU and a pallet for ODA 0325. We SP'd at 1200 hours with no issues, the movement was uneventful until the actual town of Al Hillah where we ran into a small detour that lead the convoy down some very narrow streets and low hanging wires which caused the convoy movement to come to a crawl. Once through the detour the last portion of the movement went without a problem.

The (b)(3), (b)(6) element linked up with ODA 0325 and coordinated for the down loading of the ISU and pallet. (b)(6), (b)(3) offered (b)(3), (b)(6) rest over night at their location, I told him that I appreciated it, but we needed to return to RPC Monday night to go (b)(6), (b)(3) (b)(6), (b)(3) moving toward the states on his Red Cross Message. (b)(6), (b)(3) understood and said he would be ready to move at 1600 hrs. Comms checks were conducted between the (b)(3), (b)(6) element and ODA0325 and then the two elements linked up with one vehicle of seven members of the Hillah SWAT who lead the entire convoy to Kalsu. Upon arrival at Kalsu the (b)(3), (b)(6) element linked up immediately with members from AOB 0320, performed a quick commo check and then proceeded to return to RPC. The movement was uneventful from Kalsu to RPC. Upon arrival at RPC the (b)(3), (b)(6) detail conducted a sensitive items check, upon completion the sensitive items were put up and the vehicles put in their vehicle bays to await further instructions.

(b)(6), (b)(3)

Q: For clarification are you referring to yourself as 'S2TC'?

(b)(6), (b)(3) A: S2TC (Sectant 2 TC)

(b)(6), (b)(3)

END OF STATEMENT

(b)(6), (b)(3)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(6), (b)(3), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE.

(b)(6), (b)(3)

(Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 30 day of MAY, 2008 at RPC, Baghdad, Iraq.

(b)(6), (b)(3)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(6), (b)(3)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Artiel SSC (b)(4)  
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(6), (b)(3)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES



SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: (b)(2) High BETWEEN Diwaniyah + Najaf
2. DATE: 2008 05 20
3. TIME: 1230
4. FILE NUMBER: (b)(6), (b)(3)
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: (b)(6), (b)(3)
6. SSN: (b)(6), (b)(3)
7. GRADE/STATUS: (b)(6), (b)(3)
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: HSC 3-10 SFG(A) SIGDET

I, (b)(6), (b)(3), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH (b)(6), (b)(3)
I was informed of my participation in the Convoy at ~~241300~~ 241300 MAY 08. THE OPORD WAS BRIEFED AT 1500 OF THE SAME DAY. THE BRIEF INCLUDED OUR ROUTES, TASK ORGANIZATION, AND QUICK DESCRIPTION ON ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN IF WE WERE ENGAGED BY THE ENEMY. THE INTEL PORTION OF THE BRIEF STATED THAT THE THREAT ON THE ROUTES WAS LOW. AND SMALL ARMS FIRE WOULD BE THE ENEMY MOST LIKELY COA. THE BRIEF WAS CONDUCTED BY (b)(6), (b)(3) AND LASTED 20-30 MINUTES. THE NEXT MORNING WE BEGAN STAGING THE VEHICLES AND PCT'S. AT 0600. EVERYTHING WAS IN ORDER ON THE TRUCKS. I WAS THE TC IN TRUCK 5, THE TRUCK WE WERE DROPPING OFF IN NAJAF. TRUCK 5 HAD NO MMBT OR VRC CAPABILITIES. WE BEGAN DRIVING AT 0700 AND LEFT RAC AT 0705. WE WENT ON MSR TAMOR TO ~~ALWANA~~ KALSI (b)(6), (b)(3) AND ARRIVED AT APPROX 0830. WE UNLOADED EQUIPMENT AT 0820 HOUSE AND LEFT AT APPROX 0915 EN ROUTE TO DIWANUYAH. WE STOPPED HALFWAY TO USE THE LATRINE AND FRAB WATER. EVERYTHING WAS NORMAL ON THE DRIVE THERE. WE WENT TO DIWANUYAH TO DROP OFF MORE EQUIPMENT AND 3 PAX. WE ARRIVED AT APPROX 1030 AND AFTER EVERYTHING WAS DROPPED OFF WE LEFT AT APPROX 1115. EN ROUTE TO DIWANUYAH ON THE MSR ~~NAJAF~~ (b)(6), (b)(3) I SAW AN EXPLOSION APPROX 100 METERS IN FRONT OF MY TRUCK WHERE TRUCK 1 WAS, WE DROVE PAST THE SITE OF THE EXPLOSION APPROX 50-100 METERS BEFORE WE

10. EXHIBIT
11. INITIALS: (b)(6), (b)(3) IN MAKING STATEMENT
PAGE 1 OF \_\_\_\_\_ PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF \_\_\_\_\_ TAKEN AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

ENCL#14

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF

(b)(6), (b)(3)

TAKEN AT

RIR

DATED

30 May 2008

## 9. STATEMENT (Continued)

CAME TO A STOP AND PULLED SECURITY. I DID NOT SEE TRUCK 1 GO OFF THE ROAD WHEN THE TRUCK WAS FIRST HIT. IT TOOK ME 5 MINUTES TO REALIZE THE TRUCK WAS ON FIRE AND IN THE DITCH ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE ROAD. I BELIEVE WE WERE HIT APPROX 1300. I SAW THE (b)(3), (b)(6) GET OUT OF TRUCK 2 AND THE GUNNER IN MY TRUCK (b)(6), (b)(3) FOLLOWED. I TOOK THE SPOT OF GUNNER WHEN (b)(6), (b)(3) WAS HELPING WITH THE CASUALTIES. I HEARD (b)(6), (b)(3) TRYING TO CALL FOR MEDEVAC AFTER THE LSG AND (b)(6), (b)(3) WERE AT THE CRASH SITE. I REMEMBER THAT (b)(6), (b)(3) WAS NOT GETTING THROUGH TO ANYONE. THERE WERE SEVERAL SOLDIERS GOING TO THE CRASH SITE TO ASSIST THE MEDICS. I SAW (b)(6), (b)(3) BEING TAKEN ONTO THE ROAD WITH A LITTER, SHORTLY FOLLOWED BY A LITTER WITH (b)(6), (b)(3). I HEARD (b)(6) TRYING TO GET MEDEVAC TO THE SITE OR CONTACT WITH ANY OTHER UNIT. FOR APPROX 15-30 MINUTES FROM WHEN WE STARTED CALLING FOR MEDEVAC WE DID NOT HEAR ANYTHING UNTIL (b)(6), (b)(3) CALLED LEGION AND THEY RESPONDED I THEN HEARD OVER THE RADIO THAT WARGANG 24 WAS COMING TO OUR LOCATION. APPROX 15 MINUTES LATER (b)(6), (b)(3) INFORMED EVERYONE THAT THE MEDEVAC HELICOPTERS WERE 50 MINUTES OUT. WARGANG 24 ARRIVED APPROX. AROUND THE SAME TIME (b)(3), (b)(6) INFORMED US THAT ~~WARGANG 24~~ WAS 50 MINUTES AWAY. THE (b)(3), (b)(6) WALKED BY AT THAT TIME AND I ASKED ABOUT OUR CASUALTIES. HE INFORMED ME OF 1 KIA AND 2 WIA. WARGANG 24 SHOWED UP AND HELPED US PULL SECURITY AND THEN PROCEEDED TO START CLEARING OUT THE SURROUNDING AREAS. I THINK THE IA CAME AT THAT TIME THAT WARGANG 24 BEGAN CLEARING THE AREA. AFTER APPROX 30 MORE MINUTES THE METT TEAM CAME TO RECOVER THE VEHICLES. BUT PROBABLY 15 MINUTES PRIOR THE MEDEVAC CAME AND BOTH OF OUR CASUALTIES WERE LOADED ON THE

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE

2 OF 3

PAGES

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Atc DATED 30 May

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

BIRDS WITHIN 10 MINUTES. ON THE MTT TEAMS SIDE, THEY ARRIVED AND WITHIN 30 MINUTES WERE ATTEMPTING TO RECOVER THE VEHICLE THAT WAS STRUCK. THEY FAILED PULLING IT OUT. I SAW SGT CASPER'S BODY BEING PULLED FROM THE VEHICLE, SHORTLY AFTER. WE DEPARTED FOR NAJAAF APPROX. 30 MINUTES LATER. ~~THE~~ WE WERE ESCORTED TO NAJAAF BY 0324 AND SA PERSONNEL WITH NO PROBLEMS.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: Can you describe the PC's & PER's you conducted on 25 May?

A: THE PC'S CONSISTED OF CHECKING COMMO ON TRUCKS, CHECKING OUR WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND AMMO. WE CHECKED FOR WATER & EXTRA FULL. PERSONAL PC'S WERE FOR PERSONAL WEAPONS, MDS & COMMO. MADE POSITIVE COMMO CHECK WITH BLACKSMITH BASE & DEWANIYAH.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: Do you have anything to add or delete in this statement?

A: I BELIEVE WE SHOULD OF NOTIFIED CONVOY MEMBERS OF CONVOY EARLIER AND HAD MORE COMMO TRAINING BEFORE.

// END OF STATEMENT //

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE STATEMENT AND I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 30 day of May, 2004 at (b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Archie (b)(3) (b)(6) Ulmer  
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

**SWORN STATEMENT**

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).  
**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.  
**ROUTINE USES:** Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.  
**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
RPC, Baghdad Iraq APO AE 09342	2008/05/28	1300	
5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS	

(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS  
 TPD 9 B30, B CO 9TH PSYOP BN APOE AE 09342

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 25 May, 2008, I was serving as a gunner on a convoy conducted by HSC LOSEG in order to re supply ODA's within the SOTF-Central area of operations. The day prior, all of the elements were briefed on the CONOP by (b)(3), (b)(6). The CONOP briefing was rather detailed and tailored towards this specific mission. The CONOP brief also included an updated S-2 brief covering our areas of operation for that particular mission. We also covered ROE and SOP's concerning jammer procedures and overall radio communication SOP's for the patrol. We rolled on the patrol with jammers on the entire time during the patrol. The only time that jammers were turned off was when we entered each FOB IOT call up and report to higher VIA SATCOM. We were scheduled to convoy to FOB Kalsu, and drop off PAX and equipment at that location. After leaving FOB Kalsu, we were scheduled to push on to Diwaniyah and drop off more equipment to the ODA and TPT at that location. Upon leaving Diwaniyah, the convoy was scheduled to move out to Najaf to drop off a truck and PAX to that team house. The route traveled to Najaf was a rather large Iraqi highway and the road was quiet with minimal traffic on that route during that particular time of day. The roads were rather clean, along with a minimal amount of debris on the median, and side of the road. Approximately half way through the trip from Diwaniyah to Najaf, our convoy was struck by a buried EFP in the middle of the road. The EFP struck the first vehicle and I immediately called IED x 3 over the radio, at which point, I lost sight of the vehicle due to the blast and then the convoy came to a halt. Once halted, I began scanning my sector for potential targets while trying to inform to the rest my truck as to where truck one went. I noticed that the truck had ended up in an embankment on the side of the road. I relayed that information to my TC who was (b)(3), (b)(6) and then informed him that the vehicle was on fire. During this time, TC's were trying to gain communications from truck 1, with no luck. (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) dismounted the vehicles in order to move down to the crash site and provide medical aid. Upon those dismounted personnel reaching the vehicle, they immediately called for a MEDEVAC. Upon the request for MEDEVAC (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) began trying to reach MEDEVAC on all frequencies. They continued to request MEDEVAC for about 10 minutes with no luck. At that point, the medics requested another stretcher at the burning vehicle (b)(3), (b)(6) then dismounted the truck and took an additional stretcher down to those who were providing aid. After returning to the truck, (b)(3), (b)(6) continued to make all efforts to contact any friendly US forces for another 10-15 minutes. Finally (b)(3), (b)(6) started receiving sporadic communication with CJ-SOTF concerning a MEDEVAC. At that point, we were also notified that the ODA out of Najaf was spinning up to assist with recovery/security. A few minutes later, I saw litter teams bring 2 litters up the hill and place them next to the flatbed truck that was traveling with us. The medics continued aid on (b)(3), (b)(6). This was the first time I was able to identify who the casualties were. I was then notified that SGT Frank Gasper was KIA in the EFP attack. (b)(3), (b)(6) medics that were providing aid and recovering the wounded from the site told me that they were unable to find Frank Gasper's body before the vehicle burned to the ground. A few moments later, an Iraqi ambulance pulled up and was waved into our perimeter. The medics check the ambulance to see if there was anything in there that they would be able to use on the casualties of that day. After checking and finding that there was nothing of use, they asked them to move on. After that, an Iraqi police truck pulled up with about 7 Iraqi Police (IP's) in it. At that point, I decided that I was going to dismount in order to communicate to them that the fields and houses on that route had not been cleared. I was the only one qualified to do this due to no one else on the patrol holding Arabic language skills. I continued to try and persuade them to clear the houses and fields, and follow tire tracks that led from the EFP site into a field. All of the IP's were scared and said that they would not go without me. They continued to complain about moving out into the fields and clearing them, and they started to pick up debris from the crash and get close to the EFP site. At that point I decided that it was time to send them on their way due to the level of corruption within the IP. They then asked me if I wanted more police on site, and I told them no. I told them that we did not require this because it would only cause more confusion since I was the only one on site who possessed language skills. Upon the IP's leaving the ODA from Najaf showed up and started to provide additional security. I had been monitoring the radio over my MBITR the entire time and knew that a MEDEVAC was inbound based on the traffic that was being sent internally throughout the convoy team. Once the ODA arrived, they setup additional security and prepared to take their IA security force into the fields and houses IOT clear them of any persons who may have been involved. The MEDEVAC arrived right before they moved out to clear the fields and houses and we loaded the wounded on to the Aircrafts. The ODA from Najaf and IA force returned from clearing the houses and fields with 2 detainees who were turned over to the IA for questioning. I continued to pull security until the recovery team showed up with the MITT from that area. They then began recovery operations IOT get the vehicle out of the ditch that it was in and find any remains that were left of SGT Frank Gasper. The recovery team was not able to pull the vehicle out of the ditch using the winch, so they pulled the wrecker down into the ditch and tried to use the crane to pick it up. The wrecker then flipped over and the recovery team then tried to use the 2 MIRAPs that were brought by the MITT to flip it back over, they were unsuccessful after several attempts.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS IN MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF <u>3</u> PAGES
	<u>(b)(3), (b)(6)</u>	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

ENCL # 15

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

TAKEN AT

RPC

DATED

28 May 08

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

At this point, the vehicle was moved enough to recover the remains of SGT Frank Gasper. The MITT handled the recovery of the remains while the others from the patrol continued to sweep the area for equipment that needed to be recovered from the destroyed vehicle. Upon recovering all of the equipment from the destroyed vehicle and the remains of SGT Frank Gasper were in US hands, the convoy team was exhausted. We were out of food and water. At that point, the ODA from the Najaf house stayed behind to ensure that the recovery was finished. Upon arriving at the Najaf team house, we all conducted an inventory of the sensitive items that were recovered from the EFP site along with the sensitive items that were with us during the patrol. After that, we ate and drank some water and then got some rest for the night before moving out the next day in return to RPC. In conclusion, I feel that this was a well planned and coordinated attack on our patrol. I feel that there was very little that we could have done to avoid this situation. Due to the nature of the EFP, I believe that the only thing that would have given us an advantage in this particular situation would be driving a (b)(1) 1.4 RAP vehicle. I am not sure if this would have saved the life of SGT Frank Gasper, but I am quite certain that it would have helped increase the safety of the rest of the crew. Had we been driving in (b)(1) 1.4 I feel that the injuries that were sustained to (b)(3), (b)(6) would have been far less severe.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: In your statement you mentioned ROE and SOP's concerning jammer procedures and overall radio communication SOP's for the patrol. Can you be more specific about actions that were taken by the members of the patrol during this timeframe?

A: We discussed that Jammers would only be turned off in the event that we needed to make SATCOM with Blacksmith in reference to where we were located or in the event that we needed to call for support or MEDEVAC. The jammers were all running on the standard program that is supposed to cover the broadest range of frequencies that can counter remote detonated IED threats. In reference to communications, we were briefed that all checkpoints and all major turns would be passed internally to the convoy IOT inform all members of the patrol where we were at that particular time. We were also briefed that we would pass all pertinent information in relationship to security and vehicle status as needed. All vehicles conducted a commo check prior to roll out, and all soldiers gathered up prior to mission movement and conducted personal MBITR communication checks as well. I knew that Jammers were operational during the patrol due to the humming sound that was audible over my vehicle headset. This sound is only audible when you are in the presence of Jamming equipment or Electronic Warfare.

Q: When you or members of the patrol called via SATCOM did you hear the transmission being received?

A: I was able to monitor the transmissions that were called VIA SATCOM, but did not hear any response from anyone on the SATCOM until approximately 25 minutes after the EFP Strike. Later, I was informed that they were able to hear us at the SOTF-C OPCEN and at CJSOTF but we were still unable to hear them on our end. I personally feel that we were unable to receive SATCOM with any friendly elements until the Jamming equipment from the struck vehicle burned to the ground. The AMBJ system is hooked directly to the battery, and I believe that it was still operational until the batteries burned up. The vehicle fire was primarily in the crew compartment of the vehicle, so I believe that was why it took so long for us to receive any SATCOM from higher. I also believe that the weather in that particular area was a factor in receiving SATCOM and FBCB-2 messages. The weather got continuously worse once we left Diwaniyah and we were down to about a mile visibility once we were struck. All in all, I think a combination of the weather and the jammer that was in the vehicle that was struck still being on, was detrimental in our ability to communicate with higher on any system that we had at the time.

Q: You mentioned the EFP was under the road or in the middle. Can you clarify where you think the EFP explosion came from?

A: The EFP was buried in the median. This was a rather large road and it had a dirt median with telephone poles in the middle of it. It was buried and covered very well. I was unable to be seen by any member of the patrol until after the strike had already taken place.

Q: You mentioned that (b)(3), (b)(6) was calling for a MEDEVAC on all frequencies and (b)(3), (b)(6) was also trying to make contact with friendly forces. Can you elaborate on this?

A: (b)(3), (b)(6) was attempting to reach friendly forces on his SATCOM and FBCB-2 system. He continued his attempts over and over again to all CJSOTF elements, along with sheriff net and MEDEVAC net. He called in the blind several times and tried to send up 9 Line per FBCB-2. His FBCB-2 ended up locking up on him and it was unresponsive. At this point (b)(3), (b)(6) continued to call up MEDEVAC on SATCOM and FM, while sending messages VIA FBCB-2. (b)(3), (b)(6) also continued to send out MEDEVAC request VIA radio, but at which point (b)(3), (b)(6) was in the most communication capable truck and took the lead in attempting to make communication with higher. I feel that one of the serious issues regarding FBCB-2 messages is the lack of detail that is included in the FBCB-2 ID for all of the trucks. In the future, I believe that all trucks should be updated in order to give friendly forces a better understanding as to who is requesting help. I also believe that all FBCB-2's should include a preset address book of all the FBCB-2 ID's for each battle space owner and ODA on our traveled route.

Q: Do you have anything you wish to add or delete to this statement?

A: NO

ARMED & DANGEROUS  
/ END OF STATEMENT

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT RPE DATED \_\_\_\_\_

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

*NHsd*

Approved For Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

Subj: \_\_\_\_\_  
administer oaths, this 28 day of May, 2008  
at DA

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

*Antiel 136 (b)(6)*  
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE OF PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: Landstuhl Regional Medical Center
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 20080528
3. TIME: 1345
4. FILE NUMBER:

5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME: (b)(3), (b)(6)

6. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: HHC, 3rd Bn, 1st SF Group

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
This statement is being written for (b)(3), (b)(6) due to his injuries.
On 25 May 08 at approximately 1430 hrs, I was in the lead vehicle of a convoy coming from the RPC (Regional Palace Compound) heading to An Najaf to drop off a vehicle to some Special Forces soldiers. (b)(3), (b)(6) was the gunner and Sgt Frank Casper was driving. While traveling down MSR Jackson I told (b)(3), (b)(6) to wave some civilians up ahead of us to stay out of the way. At that time I looked down at the FBCLBZ and looked out the window and felt and heard an enormous explosion. I looked over and all I saw was smoke in the vehicle and a fire had started near the center front console. I remember seeing Casper slumped over but I don't remember seeing (b)(3), (b)(6) at all. I yelled out for someone to hit the halon system but it was never engaged. I do not remember how the vehicle stopped moving but I began to pull myself from the vehicle. As I was pulling myself out I heard the ammo in the truck begin to fire off from the fire. I remember laying on my back outside the truck and yelling for help and (b)(3), (b)(6) came and pulled me away. I remember laying there until the MEDEVAC arrived. (b)(3), (b)(6) END OF STATEMENT !!!

10. EXHIBIT: (b)(3), (b)(6) PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING 'STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT (b)(3), (b)(6) DATED (b)(3), (b)(6) THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

ENCL #16

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT L.R.M.C. DATED 3/21/07

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

*[Large diagonal watermark: "Approved For Release"]*

**AFFIDAVIT**

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE

WITNESSES:

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS \_\_\_\_\_

(b)(3), (b)(6)  
 Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 21 day of May, 2007 at Carroll County Courthouse  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)  
Art. 136C.04  
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT \_\_\_\_\_ PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES



SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: RPC, IRAQ 09342
2. DATE (YYYYMM): 2008/05/28
3. TIME: 1900
4. FILE NUMBER:
5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME:
6. SSN:
7. GRADE/STATUS:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: HSC 3/10 SFG(A)

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 24 May 2008 at 0900 hours, I went out to the Convoy Locker to conduct PMCS on vehicle two. Vehicle two on the previous convoy overheated and broke down, so I had a mechanic in the motor pool, take a look at the vehicle. I double checked the vehicle and took it back to the Convoy Locker. At 1500 on the same day, I attended the convoy brief that was given by (b)(3), (b)(6). After the brief, I continued my daily mission. The next morning I woke up around 0500 hours and prepared my equipment for the convoy. I went out to the Convoy Locker to grab vehicle two and took it to the fuel point to top it off. afterwards, I staged the vehicle behind vehicle one. After all the vehicles were staged, we did our final checks and did a commo check with all personnel. At 0700 hours we moved out from RPC. We arrived at our first stop approximately an hour later, which was at Kalsu. We downloaded and uploaded some equipment, and left Kalsu approximately twenty to twenty-five minutes later. About half way to Diwaniyah, we stopped at a check point to take a ten minute brake, and then we headed out again. From the check point to Diwaniyah, it took approximately an hour and a half. When we got to Diwaniyah, we downloaded two ISU's and two pallets. Before we left to Najaf, we filled up all the vehicles. We headed down MSR Tampa and made a right onto ASR Madrid. Half way through ASR Madrid, I saw and IED hit the left side of vehicle one. (b)(3), (b)(6) said that vehicle one went into the ditch, so I pulled forward to pull security. (b)(3), (b)(6) asked for a status check from vehicle one and no one responded. He jumped out of the vehicle and went down to where vehicle one had crashed. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I continued to pull security. After giving first aid to (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) came back to the vehicle to send out messages on the FBCB2. After a while, ODA 324 arrived at the scene. At approximately 1730, we were escorted to Najaf by three Iraqi Army trucks. When we reached Najaf, we checked all sensitive items and personnel. END OF STATEMENT

Q: (b)(3), (b)(6)

A: (b)(3), (b)(6) could you elaborate on what was said/covers in the convoy brief on 28 may (b)(3), (b)(6) what actions you took on 29 may in preparation for the convoy?

A: the convoy brief covered the route that we were taking, to all of the team moves. the medicine plans, commo plans, and some intel on the routes. It covered who was in what vehicle. We also went over the map that way everyone had a visual on where we were going. the purpose of the mission was also stated. We didnt do any drills, however we talked about itps, but if we were hit by an IED or by an ambush (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: What was your assigned position in the convoy?

A: I was the driver on truck 2. (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: To the best of your recollection can you draw a brief sketch of the draw to the Convoy Locker prior to the IED Attack?

10. EXHIBIT:
11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: (b)(3), (b)(6)
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF \_\_\_\_\_ TAKEN AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

ENCL#17

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: RPC, Baghdad Iraq APO AE
2. DATE: 2008/06/04
3. TIME: 2334
4. FILE NUMBER: (b)(3), (b)(6)
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME, SSN, GRADE/STATUS: (b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: CJSOTF-AP, Camp Syverson APO AE

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

This statement was made in response to the 5-EFP Array strike occurring to the SOTF-G supply convoy on 25 1231 C May 2008 located at MGRS 38R MA 56139 33695. I am currently serving as Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force- Arabian Peninsula's (CJSOTF-AP's) Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Officer. After reviewing the post blast assessment storyboard submitted by the on sight EOD Team, a conclusion cannot be made on the initiation system since no components were recovered from the site. The majority of EFP penetrations in the HMMWV's armor occurred below the driver's side window; therefore, it is my opinion that if the personnel were traveling in an MRAP, such as the (b)(1)1.44 there would have been a greater probability of survival and decrease in injuries sustained by the crew caused by the explosion. Enclosed is a picture that shows an (b)(1)1.4a and a blue line where the height of an up-armored HMMWV compares. I have placed the approximate locations of the EFP strike points on the (b)(1)1.4a to show the probably impact sites. I cannot conclude that there would have not been injuries to the personnel if they were traveling in a (b)(1)1.4a however, due to its significant height advantage over the HMMWV and its blast resistance hull, there would have been a higher probability of the crew receiving only minor injuries.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Q. Do you have anything you wish to add or delete to this statement?
A: No

Approved for Release by NSA on 05-08-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526

(b)(3), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT, 11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: (b)(3), (b)(6), PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) DATED
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

ENCL #18

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

TAKEN AT

RPC, BAGHDAD

DATED

01 Jun 08

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

01 Jun 08  
NETC

Approved For Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 1<sup>ST</sup> day of JUNE, 2008 at RPC

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Artim 126 (b)(4) uenj  
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

